We explore whether interactions between judges affect the citation content of legal opinions.
Introduction
It is often argued that, from society's perspective, the content of a legal opinion matters more than the outcome itself, especially in appellate courts (see, e.g., Friedman 2006) . Since this content −the clarification and expansion of the law, the identification of the legal issues involved and the development of legal reasoning− is not easily captured by dichotomous measures of case outcomes or votes (Tiller and Cross 2006) , researchers and practioneers are increasingly turning to citation analysis to quantify the characteristics of cases, as well as the judges ruling upon them. The use of citations to measure the influence or prestige of individual judges (Kosma 1998 , Landes et al. 1998 ) and courts (Posner 2000) is also well established. Indeed, it has even been argued that performance measures based on citation counts could allow for more informed choices in Supreme Court appointments Gulati 2004a, 2004b ).
Despite its increasing prominence, citation analysis is not without its critics. One common misgiving is that favoritism between judges based on friendship or reciprocity may be affecting citations, especially in situations where judges are not strongly constrained by the notion of precedent (Posner 2000 , Solum 2005 ). 1 Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess this criticism as there has been no empirical work studying the social determinants of citation behavior and, more generally, little is known about the extent to which judicial behavior is affected by the contacts that judges accumulate during their working lives.
This paper contributes to the debate by exploring whether interactions between judges do influence the content of legal opinions, as captured by citations between cases.
We focus our analysis on the English Court of Appeal because its institutional features enable us to identify and interpret any such effect. The first of these features is the fact that the allocation of appellate judges to panels in this Court can be treated as effectively random. These on-the-job interactions give us the exogenous variation that we need to identify any causal effect.
The second institution that we exploit is the fact that, in the English system, discretionary citations can be positive (the legal reasoning from the cited case is explicitly applied in the citing case), neutral (the cited case is merely mentioned), or negative (the legal reasoning from the cited case is explicitly criticized). These distinctions help us to interpret any causal effect.
To see how, consider two mechanisms through which on-the-job interactions between judges could have a causal effect: knowledge diffusion −judge A is more likely to be aware of, and hence cite, a prior opinion p if he has had on-the-job interaction with its author judge B; and socialization −judge A is more likely to have developed a social preference for judge B, and hence cite prior opinion p positively, if he has had on-the-job interaction with judge B. We argue that these mechanisms have different observable consequences. 2 Specifically, if knowledge diffusion is the dominant force, on-the-job interaction should increase the likelihood that judge A cites prior opinion p, both positively and neutrally. In contrast, if socialization is the dominant force, on-the-job interaction should increase the likelihood that judge A cites prior opinion p positively but decrease the likelihood that he cites it neutrally.
The final feature that we exploit is the fact that on-the-job interaction occurs at different points in time. This temporal dimension facilitates a second test between the knowledge diffusion and socialization mechanisms. If knowledge diffusion is the dominant force, on-the-job interaction that occurs after prior opinion p (when knowledge about p could diffuse) should have a greater impact upon the likelihood that judge A cites prior opinion p than on-the-job interaction that occurs before prior opinion p (when knowledge about p could not diffuse). In contrast, if socialization is the dominant force, there is no obvious reason to expect the timing of the interaction with respect to the prior opinion p to have an effect. The temporal dimension also enables us to assess the validity of our identifying assumption.
Since on-the-job interaction that occurs after judge A has written his opinion (and is unanticipated at the time of writing) cannot have a causal effect on the likelihood that judge A cites prior opinion p, association between such "placebo "interactions and citations would call random assignment into question. Reassuringly, we find no such association.
Our findings are easy to summarise. English appellate judges randomly assigned to work with the author of a given opinion are more likely to cite that opinion positively, and less likely to cite it neutrally, than judges without such an interaction. The timing of the interaction plays no role: judges who are randomly assigned to work with the author of a given opinion before that opinion has taken place are as likely to cite that opinion as judges who are randomly assigned to work with the author of a given opinion after that opinion has taken place. These findings suggest that interactions between judges do indeed affect the content of legal opinions. Moreover, they are consistent with this effect being driven by a strengthening of socializing forces that arise as judges work together in case panels.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to explore how interactions between judges shape their citation behavior. 3 The paper most related to ours is Choi and Gulati (2008) . Studying US federal circuit court opinions, these authors show that judges appointed by Republican presidents cite other
Republican-appointed judges more often than Democrat-appointed judges, especially in 'high stakes' cases. One explanation for this finding is that judges are prone to cite colleagues with a similar ideology, and ideological similarities are more likely within political parties of appointment than between them.
Another explanation is that judges are prone to cite colleagues with whom they interact, and interaction is more likely within political parties of appointment. Unfortunately, in Choi and Gulati's setting, it is 3 In Blanes i Vidal and Leaver (2009) we also study reviews of first instance decisions upon appeal but ask whether judges who have been assigned to work with the individual who took the first instance decision are more likely to affirm than judges without such an interaction. Since these interactions are between judges serving at different levels of the judicial hierarchy, random allocation of appellate judges to panels in the Court of Appeal is not sufficient to identify the effect of interest necessitating a different empirical strategy. not possible to disentangle these effects. In contrast, our identification strategy is designed to isolate the role of social interactions from the role of ideology.
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Our paper is also related to the burgeoning literature on the existence of panel effects in the US circuit courts, whereby judges' votes depend partly on the identity of the other members in the panel (Farhand and Wawro 2004 , Fischmann 2006 , Sunstein et al. 2004 . While these studies focus on voting decisions and contemporaneous panel effects, our research shows that panel effects can also occur in terms of citation behavior and be long lasting, operating beyond the case in which judges interact.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the institutional background. In Section 3 we briefly discuss our theoretical framework and state the testable predictions. In Section 4
we present the data and empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes. The detail of the theoretical model is relegated to the Appendix.
Institutional Background
We study citations between cases in the Civil Division of the English Court of Appeal. In this section we place this division within the English court system, and summarize the types of judicial citations and the mechanisms governing the allocation of judges to cases.
The Civil Division of the Court of Appeal
The Court of Appeal is the second most senior court in England, immediately above the High Court and below the House of Lords. It has 37 judges (Lord Justices) and the overwhelming majority of cases are heard by a panel of three judges. This panel structure creates on-the-job interactions but, equally, two individual Lord Justices can spend years without directly working with each other. In contrast, the Civil Division is overwhelmingly staffed by Lord Justices and most Lord Justices spend most of their time sitting in the Civil Division. This self-contained nature of the Civil Division makes it ideal for our analysis.
The main task facing a Civil Division panel is, of course, to make a ruling allowing or dismissing the appeal in the allocated case. The panel is also expected to publish its "opinion" giving reasons for its decision. Published opinions usually refer to the facts of the case, the different laws being applied, the legal issues being considered and resolved and, crucially for our purposes, citations of prior cases. 
Types of Judicial Citation
In the English system, citations can be of different types (Westlaw 2007 ). An important initial distinction is between discretionary and non-discretionary citations. When the facts of the case are identical to those of a previous case, the rule of precedent applies and the panel has no alternative but to "follow" the previous decision. If the facts are essentially the same, except for some minor but important distinction motivating a different decision, the panel can choose to "distinguish" the case from the prior case, but must still refer to it. Lastly, when the facts are identical, but the panel regards the previous decision as unsound (and is sitting in a higher court), it can choose to "overrule" the previous decision.
Since the existence of a case with identical facts is unlikely to be missed by the panel and/or the parties to the case (and they are all but compulsory), we abstract from these non-discretionary citations. 5 A common criticism of citation analysis in the US context is that judges do not always write their own opinions, and instead delegate this task to their law clerks. In the English system the role of judicial assistants (as law clerks are known in England) is much more limited and does not include the drafting of legal opinions. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how judicial assistants could be responsible for the content of legal opinions since there is only one judicial assistant for every four Lord Justices in the English Court of Appeal (see for instance http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/7629.htm).
When the facts of the case do not have an obvious pre-existing equivalent, there may still be a prior case dealing with a similar legal issue. The panel can choose to cite this case, although it is not compulsory. These discretionary citations are the focus of our analysis and fall in to three types.
If the panel agrees with the manner in which the previous case dealt with the shared legal issue, it can highlight this fact in its published opinion (the phrase "case x applied" then appears in the text).
Alternatively, the panel can highlight that there is a case that deals with a similar legal issue but not express explicit agreement with it ("case x considered"appears). We refer to these types of citation as positive and neutral respectively. If the panel disagrees with the manner in which the previous case dealt with the shared legal issue, it also has the option to highlight this fact in its published opinion ("case x not applied" appears). In practice, this negative type of citation is extremely rare. In the Appendix we develop a theoretical model that explains the absence of negative citations and gives equilibrium meaning to positive and neutral citations. We discuss the predictions of this model in Section 3.2.
The Allocation of Judges to Panels
Once a case has been allocated to the Civil Division and the size of the panel has been determined, the task of forming the panel falls to the Court's Listing Officer. 6 The Listing Officer is an employee of the court rather than a judge. Our conversations with a listing officer for the Civil Division suggest that the principles underlying panel formation run as follows. First, only "ticketed" judges can be chosen.
7
Second, whenever possible, allocation follows the "cab-rank principle". That is, as judges dispose of their cases, they join the back of the rank and wait to receive a new case; as a case requiring a panel of size n arrives, the Listing Officer matches it to the first n judges in the rank. Third, in the event of a tie (more than n judges joined the rank at the same time), the panel is formed at random. 6 In principle the judge in charge of the division can exercise a supervisory role. Our conversations with judges who have run divisions indicate that this prerogative is exercised in less than 3 percent of cases.
7 Serving appellate judges (Lord Justices) are automatically ticketed. Other judges can be ticketed at the discretion of the Head of Civil Justice.
Strict application of the cab-rank principle suggests that it is the duration of the previous case that determines whether or not a judge will be allocated to a particular case. Since we are interested in the interactions between judges rather than in the matching of judges to cases per se, an important caveat applies. Suppose that three judges are already working on a case together. As they dispose of that case, the three of them will join the cab-rank at the same time. As a result, they are more likely to be matched with each other in the immediate future than to be matched with other judges dealing with other cases. In short, in steady state there will be serial correlation in on-the-job interactions even if the initial allocation is random.
For our purposes, serial correlation is not a problem as long as the initial allocation is truly random.
To ascertain whether this is the case, we first need to pinpoint the initial allocation. issued on this day (July 31) alone. Since these two pieces of evidence suggest that the panel formation process starts afresh each legal year, we take the first matches of the legal year to be the initial allocation and test whether they can realistically be viewed as random draws. Since our objective is to test for random initial allocations, the ideal strategy would be to restrict attention to committees formed on or shortly after the first day of the Michaelmas Term. Unfortunately, since we observe judgment but not commencement dates, this is not possible. Instead, we deem a case to be an initial case if its judgment date falls in the first term of the legal year. In view of the end of term effects apparent in Figure 1 , the committees in these cases will plausibly be filled early in Michaelmas Term before the cab-rank principle (and the concomitant serial correlation) is at work.
Testing for Random Panel Formation
Turning to the notion of contemporaries, it is clear that a match can only occur if the judges concerned have overlapping periods of service. We account for this potential source of non-randomness in two stages. First, we identify the set of appellate judges whose periods of service overlap with a given judge x. Then, given our focus on Michaelmas Term, we exclude judges who were either appointed before judge x's first Michaelmas Term or after his last Michaelmas Term. We define the remaining individuals as judge x's contemporaries; the idea being that these are judges who could have been matched with judge x on an initial case.
Of course, adopting the above definition of an initial case, raises the issue of whether to use all of a judge's cases in a Michaelmas Term when calculating his proportion matched with judge x. To mitigate the possibility of within-term serial correlation, we use a binary rather than continuous match variable. Specifically, we construct a dummy variable matched nt that takes the value 1 if contemporary n is matched with judge x in at least one case in Michaelmas Term t and 0 if contemporary n is not matched with, but still serves alongside, judge x in the same Michaelmas Term t.
With these definitions in place, our test proceeds as follows. For each judge x = 1, ..., 91 we:
1. Identify his set of contemporaries (and denote its cardinality by N x ).
2. For each contemporary n = 1, ...N x , construct the dummy variables matched nt and contemporary n (an individual fixed effect). can realistically be viewed as random draws.
Theoretical Framework
How will the different types of discretionary citation be affected by on-the-job interaction? In fact, why are there different types of citations or even citations at all? To answer these questions, we develop a game-theoretic model of discretionary citation. This model pins down a rationale for discretionary citations and gives equilibrium meaning to the terms discussed in Section 2.2. It is important to note that the objective of our theoretical model is not to capture every possible reason why citations may occur in practice. Instead, we aim to provide a framework through which we can derive comparative statics results and hence testable predictions to take to the data. In this Section we give an overview of this model, relegating the formal details to the Appendix.
Set-up of the Model We start our overview by introducing a small amount of notation. Since a citation occurs (or fails to occur) between two cases, our unit of analysis must be a pair of cases. We will refer to the case making the citation decision as case i, and to the case (potentially) receiving the citation as case j. Figure 3a displays i (decided by judges i1, i2 and i3) and j (decided by judges j1, j2
and j3) along a time line, noting that i must occur later in time than j. Our focus is on pairs of cases whose panels do not contain any common judges. Citations occurring between pairs of cases sharing at least one judge are essentially self-citations and fall outside the scope of this paper. An on-the-job interaction occurs when the judges from i and j work together. In other words, when there is one other case including at least one judge from i and one judge from j. We will refer to this third case as the interaction case. Figure 3b displays an example of such an interaction case, with a panel comprising i1, j1 and a third judge h3.
With this notation in hand, we can state our key modeling assumptions. The first set of assumptions specify the costs and benefits of making a citation. Making a citation entails an effort cost for the judges in case i, and this cost is higher for positive and negative citations than for neutral citations.
8 Making a 8 Recall that neutral citations only entail stating that case j has been observed and deals with the same legal issue, citation benefits the judges in i to the extent that it: (i) discourages an appeal; and (ii) casts the judges in j in a positive light. To see how these benefits might arise, consider a positive citation. The phrase "case j applied "is equivalent to stating that, since the decision in j coincides with the decision in i,
there is evidence that the decision in i is likely to be correct. This discourages an appeal by the losing party. Of course, "case j applied "is also equivalent to stating that, since the decision in j coincides with the decision in i, there is evidence that the decision in j is likely to be correct. This casts the judges in j in a positive light.
The second set of assumptions specify how on-the-job interactions impact upon the costs and benefits of making a citation. Obviously, the judges in i can only derive a benefit and/or cost from citing case j if they are aware of its existence at the time of case i. We assume that an on-the-job interaction occurring before i but after j increases the likelihood of this happening. The logic is illustrated in Figure 3b :
j1 can share information about his previous case j while working together with i1 in the interaction case, and i1 may then remember this information while writing the opinion in case i. This knowledge diffusion effect is not the only consequence of on-the-job interaction, however. We also assume that an on-the-job interaction occurring before i increases the social preference that the judges in i have for the judges in j (and hence the benefit from casting them in a positive light) at the time of their citation decision. We refer to this as a socialization effect. Notice that this effect is present in Figure 3c as well as Figure 3b , as the existence of case j is no longer relevant.
Analysis of the Model Our model predicts that positive and neutral citations, but not negative citations, are observed in equilibrium. This is consistent with the empirical evidence in Section 5. The reason why negative citations do not occur in equilibrium is obvious: they carry an effort cost and, by highlighting that the decision in case j is in disagreement with the decision in i, invite appeals. Neutral citations are attractive because they entail less effort. Consequently, if the panel in i observes that rather than having to explain why the decision in j agrees (or disagrees) with the decision in i.
the decision in j is in agreement with case i, it might decide to signal this fact with a neutral citation rather than with a more costly positive citation. This is important because, in equilibrium, it allows a small fraction of panels who have observed that j is in disagreement with case i to pool in the neutral citation action.
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Having established why different types of citations occur, we can now turn to comparative statics.
Our first prediction concerns the effect of knowledge diffusion.
Prediction 1 (Knowledge Diffusion
). An interaction case that occurs before case i but after case j reduces the probability of no citation and increases the probability of both a neutral and a positive citation from case i to case j.
If a judge from j works with a judge from i after case j has taken place, then there is a chance that the judge from i will acquire knowledge of the existence of case j during the interaction. If the interaction also occurs before i, then the model predicts that this increase in the probability that the judges in i are aware of the existence of j will increase the likelihood of both positive and neutral citations. When the judges in i are more likely to be informed of j, they are more likely to learn that the decision in j agrees with their decision. This increases the likelihood of both positive and neutral citations. However, they are also more likely to find that the decision in j disagrees with their decision which, in equilibrium, leads to an extra increase in the likelihood of a neutral citation.
Of course, if a judge from j works with a judge from i, then there is also a chance that the judge from i will develop a social preference for the judge from j during the interaction. Our second prediction therefore concerns the effect of socialization.
Prediction 2 (Socialization). An interaction case that occurs before case i increases the probability of a positive citation and decreases the probability of a neutral citation from case i to case j. 9 See the Appendix for a more detailed explanation of this effect.
If an interaction case occurs before i, then the model predicts that the resulting increase in the probability that the judges in i have a social preference for the judges in j will increase the likelihood of a positive citation but decrease the likelihood of a neutral citation. When the judges in i care more about the judges in j, they find it more attractive to cite j positively even if it is costly to do so. This leads to a substitution into positive citations and away from neutral citations.
Empirical Tests We take these predictions to the data by comparing the proportion of pairs with a citation across the Treated Between category (displayed in Figure 3b ) and the No Treatment category (Figure 3a) , and then repeat this exercise for the proportion of citing pairs with a positive cite. Given random assignment, if we find a statistically significant difference across categories, we can conclude that on-the-job interactions do influence the citation content of legal opinions. Depending on the sign of any difference(s), we may also be able to pinpoint the underlying mechanism. For instance, a finding that the proportion of pairs with a citation is lower for the Treated Between than for the No Treatment category would be inconsistent with knowledge diffusion.
To probe further, we also compare proportions across the Treated Before j category (Figure 3c ) and the No Treatment category. If we find a statistically significant difference here, we cannot attribute this to knowledge diffusion because the necessary information did not exist at the time of the interaction.
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In contrast, a finding that, say, the proportion of citing pairs with a positive cite is higher for the Treated Before j category than for the No Treatment category would be consistent with socialization.
Finally, to assess the validity of our key identifying assumption, we compare proportions across the Placebo category (Figure 3d ) and the No Treatment category. Since an interaction occurring after i cannot affect citation behavior itself, a difference could only arise if interactions are correlated with some other citation relevant characteristic. Finding a difference here would therefore amount to a rejection of our key identifying assumption. For obvious reasons, we refer to this as a placebo test.
Data and Estimation

A Choice-Based Sample of Pairs of Cases
While it is straightforward to identify pairs of cases where a discretionary citation occurred, it is less obvious how to identify censored pairs where a discretionary citation could have, but did not, occur.
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To tackle this issue, we construct our data set in two stages: first identifying a population of pairs and then drawing a choice-based sample. Matching each of these 'case j's' with case 1 gives us the population of (within 5 year Westlaw Reported) 1j pairs. Repeating this exercise for i = 2, ..., 8923 cases we obtain a population of 23, 551, 316 (within 5 year Westlaw Reported) ij pairs.
It is helpful to divide this large population into 'year of citing case' strata. Following standard notation, we let h = 1, ..., L denote the year of the citing case where, in the full sample, L = 26.
Further, we let n = 1, ..., U h index the uncensored pairs within strata h and n = U h + 1, .., M h the censored pairs within strata h. Here M h is number of pairs (observations) within strata h, with U h the number of uncensored pairs and C h = M h −U h the number of censored pairs. The size of the population, M , can therefore be written as
For each strata, we first select all U h uncensored pairs and then draw (with replacement) a sample of 11 Citations are flagged as non-discretionary, positive, neutral, and negative by Westlaw UK.
censored pairs of size c h = U h · 10. The size of our sample, m, is therefore
U h + c h = 1, 412 + 14, 120 = 15, 532.
Under this sample design, an uncensored pair n in strata h has a sampling weight w hn = U h /U h = 1, while a censored pair n in strata h has a sampling weight
Westlaw appeared to change its own sampling methodology in 1993 (see Table A1 
Constructing Our Measure of On-the-job Interaction
The empirical tests set out in Section 3 require a variable that indicates which (if any) of the four categories in Figure 3 each observation belongs to. To illustrate how we construct this variable, consider an observation with no common judges, at least one judge from i who is a contemporary (in the sense defined in Section 2.4) of a judge in j, and a single interaction case between these judges. This observation will be assigned to: the Treated Before j category if the interaction case falls in the first 12 Michaelmas Term before case j; the Treated Between category if it falls in the first Michaelmas Term after case j; and the Placebo category if it falls in the first Michaelmas Term after i. 13 We assign observations with no interaction cases in any of these terms to the No Treatment category. Observations with common judges, no contemporaries, or with interaction cases in multiple periods do not form part of our empirical tests (for details see Table 2 ). 12 In view of the evidence in Section 2.4, the existence of an interaction case in Michaelmas Term can be treated as exogenous, i.e. orthogonal to citation-relevant unobservables. However, to avoid introducing a mechanical correlation between interaction categories and elapsed time between j and i, we focus on single Michaelmas Terms around i and j. 13 The same procedure applies if the observation has multiple interaction cases, as long as they fall in the same term.
Estimation
We test Predictions 1 and 2 using comparisons of proportions (or means) and, for robustness, binary response regression models.
Comparison of Means
The simplest estimator of the difference in the proportions of pairs with a citation across two groups is the difference in their sample proportions. A test based on the sample difference is valid as long as we are certain that the allocation of a pair into the alternative groups is uncorrelated with any other variable determining citation behavior. Apart from its simplicity, this method has the advantage of not imposing any particular functional form in the estimation of the relation between on-the-job interactions and citation behavior.
We calculate the difference in the sample proportions as follows. Let X hn ∈ {0, 1} denote a binary citation outcome variable for pair n in strata h, and x hn the corresponding variable for sampled pair n in strata h. Moreover, let S denote the set of pairs that belong to the subpopulation of interest, where the variable I S hn indicates whether a pair belongs to this subpopulation. Recalling that the population size is M, the population proportion for this binary citation outcome variable is
Using the sample weights, w hn , defined in Section 4.1, the estimator for the population proportion, P , can be written as
14 The variance of this estimator, V ( P ), can be approximated as follows. First define the score variable by z hn ( P S ) = S hn z hn . This variance estimator is an approximation to V ( P ) and is algebraically equivalent to the variance estimator derived from directly applying the delta method.
Binary Response Models Both the balancing tests and placebo tests reported in Section 5 below provide support for our key identifying assumption of random assignment. However, as a further robustness check, we complement our comparisons of means with the estimation of binary response models.
The empirical model (in error component form) that we use to explain the likelihood of a citation for pair of cases ij is
where Lastly, we include a row vector of case-level and judge-level covariates, X ij , in some of our empirical specifications. This vector includes the elapsed time between the two cases, whether case j was reported in The Times newspaper law report, and the number of legal journal articles that mentioned case j in the period before case i took place, as well as a number of judge-level characteristics.
The empirical model that we use to explain the proportion of cited pairs with a positive cite for pair of cases ij is
where P ositive ij takes the value 1 if case i cited case j positively, rather than neutrally. The rest of variables are defined as in model (1) . Note that this second model is based exclusively on pairs of cases for which a citation occurred.
The models in (1) and (2) can be estimated separately if there are no unobservables that determine both the (selection) decision whether to cite, and the (outcome) decision how to cite. To relax this assumption, we also estimate the two models jointly using a binary sample selection specification where ε ij and ij are assumed to be joint normally distributed with covariance ρ. 15 Of course, for identification,
we require (at least) one exclusion restriction; that is, at least one covariate that is part of the selection equation in (1) but not part of the outcome equation in (2) . We use the elapsed time between the two cases, whether case j was reported in The Times newspaper law report, and the number of legal journal articles that mentioned case j in the period before case i. It seems plausible that these variables affect the likelihood that judges in case i are aware of the existence of case j, but not whether these judges decide to cite positively rather than neutrally.
Results
In Table 1 we report the number of observations by category of on-the-job interaction. Note that this table reports sample rather than population sizes. While the number of population pairs is 23,517,932, the sample that we use for our analysis contains only 13,032 pairs. Out of these, 3,249 pairs belong to one of the four categories in Figure 3 , and will be used in our empirical tests. The number of pairs displaying a positive citation is 423, while 471 pairs display a neutral citation. The number of negative citations is extremely low (just 5 citations). This is consistent with our theoretical framework, in which negative citations are both costly and increase the likelihood of appeal and are therefore avoided. In the next section we summarize our results. In the Section 5.2, we draw these findings together and discuss whether we can claim to have identified, and interpreted, a causal effect.
Summary
Balancing Tests Table 2 In Table 3 we compare observable case characteristics across interaction categories. Our first set of variables are the elapsed time between i and j, whether i and j share the same legal subject, whether j has appeared in The Times law reports and the number of times that j has been mentioned in legal journal articles. For each of these variables, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the mean for pairs in the Treated Between category is the same as the mean for pairs in the No Treatment category. This is also true for pairs in the Treated Before j and Placebo categories.
The last two columns of Table 3 display the size of the panels in case i and j. For these variables, we do find meaningful differences across categories. The mean panel sizes for the No Treatment category are slightly smaller than for the other categories of interest, and the differences are statistically significant.
Of course, this could be a purely spurious finding: the higher the number of comparisons that we perform, the more likely it is that one of these comparisons will appear as statistically significant. More reassuringly, when we include panel sizes as controls, the coefficients of interest are virtually unchanged.
In Table 4 we compare observable judge characteristics across interaction categories. Our variables are the following: whether at least one ij judge pair attended the same secondary school at the same time, whether at least one ij judge pair attended the same university (or college in case of Oxford and Cambridge) at the same time, whether at least one ij judge pair practiced from the same as barrister's chambers (prior to becoming a judge), and whether at least one ij judge pair are members of the same (Gentleman's or sports) club. Again, for each of these variables, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the mean for pairs in the Treated Between category is the same as the mean for pairs in the No Treatment category. With one exception, this is also true for pairs in the Treated Before j and Placebo categories (the Placebo category seems to have a disproportionately large number of pairs in which at least one ij judge pair practiced as barristers from the same chambers). As such, it seems reasonable to conclude that the four categories are statistically similar in terms of (almost) every observable variable.
Citation versus No Citation
In Table 5 we report the proportion of pairs with a citation by interaction category. The proportions are lowest for the Treated Between and Treated Before j categories and largest for the Placebo and No Treatment categories. However, for both the comparison of means and the probit regression without controls displayed in Column 1, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that these proportions are identical across the four categories. In Column 2 we add the case-level controls discussed in the preceding Section, all of which are strongly significant. In Column 3 we add the judge-level social network controls also discussed above. The coefficients of the Treated Between, Treated Before j, and Placebo dummies remain insignificant at conventional levels. As such, we find no evidence that on-the-job interactions are associated with higher likelihood of citation. If anything, that likelihood is lower (although it is not statistically significant) when judges in i and j have interacted prior to i. Table 6 Between group dummies are virtually the same in the three regressions. Table 7 displays the coefficients and standard errors from estimation of a binary sample selection model. In the selection equation of this model, the endogenous variable is whether the pair displays a citation; in the outcome equation it is whether the citation is positive or neutral.
Positive versus Neutral Citation
Joint Estimation
The most important finding in Table 7 is that the coefficients of the outcome equation in the two-stage model are very similar to those in Table 6 , where the probability of a positive citation (conditional on a citation occurring) is estimated as an independent probit model. The coefficients for the Treated Between and Treated Before j and dummies are similar in magnitude and statistically significant at the 5% and 10% respectively. Just as in Table 6 , the introduction of case-level and judge social network controls has almost no impact on the magnitude of the coefficients or their statistical significance.
Discussion
Our key finding is that there is a statistically (and economically) significant difference in the proportion of citing pairs with a positive citation across the treated and untreated categories. Of course, we can only take this as evidence that on-the-job interactions influence the citation content of legal opinions if our assumption of random assignment is valid.
Three observations (in addition to the tests in Section 2.4) suggest that this identifying assumption is valid. First, and most convincingly, we were unable to reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the proportion of citing pairs with a positive citation across the Placebo and No Treatment categories. This is reassuring since it is hard to imagine that unobservables associated with both citation and interaction could drive our key finding but then fail to produce a difference in this placebo test. Second, the balancing tests in Tables 2 to 4 found few differences in terms of observable case and judges characteristics across interaction categories, as one would expect if assignment was truly random. Third (and relatedly), in all specifications, inclusion of these observables as controls left the magnitude and statistical significance of our coefficients virtually unchanged.
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Having argued that on-the-job interactions matter, we now discuss whether it is possible to interpret the underlying mechanism. When comparing the Treated Between and No Treatment categories, we found no evidence of a difference in the proportion of pairs with a citation. In combination with our key finding, this implies that the effect of treatment was to increase the incidence of positive citation but decrease the incidence of neutral citation. Referring back to Predictions 1 and 2, we therefore have support for the notion that on-the-job interactions lead to an increase in social preferences among Court of Appeal judges, but not for the notion that knowledge diffusion is the predominant effect of on-the-job interaction between judges.
This interpretation is strengthened by the comparisons across the Treated Before j and No Treatment categories. Again, the results imply that treatment increased the incidence of positive citation and decreased the incidence of neutral citation. As discussed in Section 3, this is consistent with socialization, but not knowledge diffusion, being the predominant effect of on-the-job interaction between judges. If knowledge only flows as judges work together, then treatment should have no effect since case j did not exist at the time of the on-the-job interaction. Moreover, even if knowledge can flow in subsequent social settings (that arise because of on-the-job interaction) treatment should increase rather than decrease the incidence of neutral citation.
To conclude, both tests provide evidence in favor of the socialization hypothesis, and fail to provide evidence in support of the knowledge diffusion hypothesis. 16 We refrain from commenting on the coefficients of the controls themselves given the obvious possibility of endogeneity.
Concluding Remarks
The objective of this paper was to explore whether interactions between judges affect the citation content of legal opinions. Our results indicate that on-the-job interactions between judges do shape citations, and are consistent with this effect being driven by a strengthening of socializing forces that arise as judges work together in case panels. As such, we provide the first quantitative empirical support for the widely held suspicion (Posner 2000) that citation decisions are, at least partially, affected by extra-legal considerations.
This finding has direct implications for the use of citation variables as measures of case and judge influence. In particular, it suggests special caution when using citations made by judges who are socially connected to those whom they cite. In a US Circuit Court context this might extend to weighting discretionary citations (i.e. those not dictated by the notion of precedent) from cases in a judge's own court differently to citations from cases in other jurisdictions. Of course, all performance variables are subject to potential contamination by strategic decision-making, and it would be surprising if performance measurement in the judiciary was free from this limitation. 17 By contributing to our understanding of the determinants of citations, we hope that this paper might lead to a more judicious use of citation analysis in both the academic and policy fields.
Appendix Set-up of the Model
There are two strategic players: a panel (it) hearing a case i in the Court of Appeal and a losing party (she). Our primary interest is in the forces determining whether/how the panel in case i cites some previous case j. Our starting assumption is that there is a correct ruling, a "state of the world" x ∈ {0, 1}. For concreteness, we let x = 0 denote the state where the appeal should be dismissed (the first instance ruling was right) and x = 1 the state where the appeal should be allowed (the first instance ruling was wrong). The panel in case i cannot observe x but can combine its own legal knowledge with the facts of the case to deduce what this state is likely to be. We equate this process of deduction with the generation of a private non-verifiable signal on x, s ∈ {0, 1}, with precision p ∈ (1/2, 1]. Having generated s, the panel (i) makes a ruling r ∈ {0, 1} dismissing or allowing the appeal and (ii) sends a message M via its "published opinion".
After the panel has made its ruling and published its opinion, the losing party decides whether to lodge an appeal to the House of Lords. We normalize the losing party's net benefit from a successful appeal to 1 and assume that her cost of appealing, a, is private information but is commonly known to be distributed U [0, 1]. If the losing party does not appeal, the panel's ruling is implemented immediately. Otherwise, case i moves to the House of Lords where, after some delay, Law Lords implement the correct ruling r = x.
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Private Preferences (Confidence in i's Ruling) The panel in case i wants to see justice done, receiving a private payoff of 1 when the correct ruling is implemented (either by itself or by Law Lords on appeal) and 0 otherwise. However, it is also keen to avoid unnecessary delays in the legal process and will therefore strive to avoid an appeal when it is sufficiently confident that its ruling is correct. Formally, we write the panel's expected private utility from taking ruling r and sending message M as:
where δ < 1/2 is a discount factor applied to future payoffs and I is the panel's information set defined immediately below.
Information and the Published Opinion Aside from generating s, the panel can potentially improve its estimate of x by consulting prior cases. By assumption, the panel can only consult cases in its knowledge set (the subset of the population of prior cases that it is aware of). Since our objective is to derive predictions for a pair of cases, we focus our attention on the panel's behavior towards a single prior case j.
We denote the probability that case j is in case i's knowledge set by t. It is important to stress that t is an exogenous parameter rather than a choice variable; it will be higher when there is an interaction case occurring before i but after j. With probability 1 − t, the panel is unaware of case j and necessarily makes no citation. Otherwise with probability t, the panel consults case j and, as a first step, learns whether it tackles the same legal issue (an event that occurs with probability β) or is unrelated (an event that occurs with probability 1 − β). If the two cases do tackle the same legal issue the panel receives a signal s l that provides hard evidence that case j is informative about x.
The sense in which case j might be informative about x is obvious: observing that a panel in a previous case tackling the same legal issue took a particular ruling provides evidence that the same ruling should be applied in the current case. To capture this idea, we assume that, conditional on case j tackling the same legal issue, the panel in case i receives a second signal on x, s r ∈ {0, 1}, where the subscript r is used to signify "ruling" as distinct from "legal issue". If the panel in case j allowed its appeal, then s r = 1. Conversely, if the panel in case j dismissed its appeal, then s r = 0. For simplicity, we assume that the precision of s r (as privately perceived by the panel in case i) is q ∈ [1/2, p) since this ensures that this second signal is informative but not pivotal. 19 To summarize, we can think of the panel in case i as being one of three different types:
Notice that the panel's confidence that its ruling is correct is increasing in type. Type 1 has low confidence, having received a contradictory signal, type 2 has intermediate confidence having received no new information and type 3 has high confidence, having received a confirmatory signal. It follows from (4) that, by disclosing (or indeed hiding) the existence of the previous case j in its published opinion, the panel may be able to influence the likelihood of an appeal. This signaling comes at a cost however. First, there is a cost c for simply making a reference to case j (i.e. revealing s l which can be equated with the citation term "considered"). This cost reflects the effort necessary to enter the citation in the correct place in the opinion, cite the original source accurately and clarify why the legal issues are the same. Second, there is an extra cost κ for making a reference to the ruling in case j (i.e. revealing that r = s r , which can be equated with the citation term "applied" or r = s r which can be equated with the citation term "not applied"). This cost reflects the effort required to justify in writing why the previous case reaches a conclusion which lends credibility to the panel's decision (r = s r ) or why it is contradictory with it (r = s r ). We assume that these costs are the panel's private information but are commonly known to be independently and identically distributed U [0, 1] . In what follows we will say that the panel makes no citation if it sends a null message, a neutral citation if it reveals only s l , a positive citation if it reveals r = s r , and a negative citation if it reveals r = s r .
Social Preferences (Confidence in j's Ruling) We complete the model with the final assumption that, as well as wanting to see justice done (quickly), the panel in case i potentially cares about the public perception of case j. Specifically, we assume that the panel in case i receives utility α ∈ [0, 1) from casting the panel in case j in a good light via a positive citation. 20 Again we stress that α is an exogenous parameter; it will be higher when there is an interaction case occurring before i. The panel's total (private plus social) expected utility from taking ruling r and sending message M given information I is therefore given by:
where K is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the panel makes a positive citation and 0 otherwise. 
Analysis
Our solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. This requires the losing party and each type of panel (1, 2 or 3) to maximize expected utility given the other players' strategies, and the losing party to adjust her beliefs using Bayes' rule whenever possible. In solving the model, we make the simplifying assumption that the type 3 panel always makes a citation. Although this is a strong assumption, it has the advantage of simplifying the comparative statics that are a key objective of the modeling exercise. Before solving the model, it will be helpful to derive some key probabilities that underpin the analysis. First, the common prior beliefs over type are
and
Second, the probabilities of each type's ruling being correct are
Losing Party Behavior Naturally, when deciding whether to appeal to the House of Lords, the losing party weighs her belief that the ruling was incorrect against the appeal cost a. Letting σ denote the panel's strategy, the losing party appeals if
where
As the final term on the RHS in (11) indicates, to apply this decision rule the losing party must update her beliefs over type given M and σ. This updating is much simpler than it sounds. Type 1 will either make no citation or a neutral citation (a negative citation is possible but, from the LHS of (9), is strictly dominated as it invites an appeal); type 2 can only make no citation; while type 3 will, by assumption, either make a neutral citation or a positive citation. As a result, the panel's strategy space collapses to the unit square. We write a strategy for the panel as σ = (b 1 , b 3 ), where b 1 denotes the probability type 1 makes a neutral (rather than no) citation and b 3 the probability type 3 makes a positive citation (rather than a neutral) citation. Applying Bayes' rule to obtain Pr[type|M, σ] and using Pr[r = x|type] given in (9), the losing party's assessment that the ruling is correct given M and beliefs over σ can then be written as
Obviously, the losing party's assessment that the ruling is incorrect is just the complement of these probabilities. Note that, since a ∼ U [0, 1], (12)- (14) also give us the panel's belief that the case will not
Citation Behavior As noted above, a type 2 panel cannot make a citation because it has no information. Instead, consider type 1 behavior. From (3), the net benefit to a type 1 panel of making a neutral citation rather than no citation (via the reduction in the probability of an appeal) is
For any level of this net benefit, we can define a threshold level of the neutral citation cost,c, equal to (15) such that all type 1 panels with c >c make no citation and all type 1 panels with c <c make a neutral citation. The probability that type 1 makes a neutral citation, b 1 , is then obtained by evaluating the uniform CDF at this thresholdc. Notice that the behavior of type 1 depends on the behavior of type 3 via the losing party's inference following a neutral citation (the first term in (15) is a function of b 3 ). Now consider type 3 behavior. From (5), the net benefit to a type 3 panel of making a positive rather than neutral citation (via the reduction in the probability of an appeal and the opportunity to cast case j in a good light) is
Again, for any level of this net benefit, we can define a threshold level of the positive citation cost, κ, equal to (16) such that all type 3 panels with κ >κ make a neutral citation and all type 3 panels with κ <κ make a positive citation. The probability that type 3 makes a positive citation, b 3 , is then obtained by evaluating the uniform CDF at this thresholdκ. Again, notice that the behavior of type 3 depends on the behavior of type 1 via the losing party's inference following a neutral citation (the second term in (16) is a function of b 1 ).
Equilibrium and Comparative Statics An equilibrium of this game between the panel and losing party is a pair of thresholdsc andκ that imply that the losing party beliefs over σ that are correct. Proof. To save notation, we will use p p to denote (12) , p n to denote (13) , and p to denote (14) . In addition, let δ 1 = (Pr[r = x|type = 1] − δ) and δ 3 = (Pr[r = x|type = 3] − δ). For a given type 3 threshold,κ, type 1 behavior and losing party beliefs will be consistent if:
Notice that (17) implicitly defines a reaction function for type 1, which we will denote byc = f (κ). Similarly, for a given type 1 threshold,c, type 3 behavior and losing party beliefs will be consistent if:
Equation (18) implicitly defines a reaction function for type 3, which we denote byκ = g(c). 
After some algebraic manipulation, it is also possible to show that
Together these derivatives imply that the type 1 reaction functionc = f (κ) is strictly decreasing, while the type 3 reaction functionκ = g(c) is strictly increasing. This monotonicity, together with the fact thatκ = f −1 (c = 0) = 1 >κ = g(c = 0) = α, tells us that the reaction functions do indeed cross once (atκ * ,c * ) and hence that an equilibrium exists and is unique.
To clarify the intuition, consider how the type 1 thresholdc varies with the type 3 thresholdκ. Whenκ = 1, no type 3 panel is issuing a neutral citation. From a type 1 panel's perspective, making a neutral citation therefore entails paying a cost to increase the likelihood of an appeal. This is because a neutral citation will be read as cast iron evidence that the panel in case j tackled the same legal issue but made a different ruling to the panel in case i. Consequently, no type 1 panel finds it worth while to make a neutral citation (c = 0). In contrast, when enough type 3 panels issue neutral citations (requiring lowerκ), a neutral citation is better news and at least some type 1 panels are prepared to pay a cost to mimic type 3 (implying an increase inc). In sum,c is decreasing inκ. Now consider how the type 3 thresholdκ varies with the type 1 thresholdc. Whenc = 0, no type 1 panel is issuing a neutral citation. From a type 3 panel's perspective, there is no private preference gain from issuing a positive citation. This is because a neutral citation will now be read as cast iron evidence that the panel in case j tackled the same legal issue and made the same ruling as the panel in case i. Instead, the only benefit from issuing a positive citation stems from the social preference term α. Consequently, only those type 3 panel's with a cost less than α make a citation (κ = α). In contrast, when at least some type 1 panels issue neutral citations (requiring higherc), making a neutral citation is worse news and at least some type 3 panels are prepared to pay a cost to signal their high confidence. In sum,κ is increasing inc. Since these reaction functions cross once, we have a unique PBE.
Having characterized this equilibrium, we can proceed to the main objective of the exercise: comparative statics with respect to "knowledge" t and "social preference" α.
Proposition 2. The citation thresholdc
* is increasing in "knowledge" t and decreasing in "social preference" α. The positive citation thresholdκ * is increasing in both t and α. Furthermore,c * +(1−κ * ) is increasing in t.
Proof. Consider the equilibrium given by the conditions:
Differentiatingc * andκ * with respect to α, and using the inequalities derived above, we have
Similarly, differentiatingc * andκ * with respect to t we have
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is straightforward. Recall that the parameter t reflects the probability that case j is in panel i's knowledge set. As t increases, making no citation becomes more indicative of being a type 1 panel and less indicative of being a type 2 panel. This increases the likelihood of appeal under no citation, thus strengthening the incentive for a type 1 panel to issue a neutral citation. This in turn increases the likelihood of an appeal under a neutral citation and so a type 3 panel's benefit from making a positive citation rises. In the new equilibrium bothc * andκ * have increased. We use the observation thatc * +(1−κ * ) is increasing in t since it implies that the probability (from the econometrician's perspective) of case i issuing a neutral citation is strictly increasing in t. The reason stems from the fact that the type 3 reaction function has a slope lower than one. Consequently, the tendency for a type 1 panel to substitute toward a neutral citation dominates the tendency for a type 3 panel to substitute away from a neutral citation.
As α increases, making a positive citation becomes more attractive for a type 3 panel. As a result theκ reaction function shifts upwards, implying that a smaller proportion of type 2 panels issue neutral citations. This, in turn, increases the probability of an appeal under a neutral citation, thus reducing the incentives for type 1 panels to issue them. In the new equilibriumκ * has increased andc * has decreased.
Observable Citation Behavior We can now draw out two predictions of the theory that are couched in terms of observable citation behavior. To do so, we first use Proposition 1 to derive the probability that the econometrician (unaware of panel type) will observe each of the four possible citations. Since negative citations never occur in equilibrium, the three relevant probabilities for no, neutral, and positive citation are:
Using (6)- (8) and Proposition 2, we can establish how (19)- (21) depend on t and α: Prediction 1. An increase in "knowledge" t reduces the probability of no citation and increases the probability of neutral and positive citation from case i to j.
Prediction 2. An increase in "social preference" α increases the probability of positive citation and decreases the probability of neutral citation from case i to j.
Notice that t and α have contrasting predictions relating to the probability of no citation and neutral citation. Since we make use of this difference in the empirical analysis, it is worth emphasizing the intuition. The reason why t decreases the probability of no citation should be obvious: type 2 (the type that is not aware of case j) is less likely. Similarly, the probability of neutral citation increases because type 1 (the type inclined to cite neutrally) is more likely. True, type 3 is also more likely, and further, is more likely to issue positive citations. But, for the reason stated in Proposition 2 (c * +(1−κ * ) is increasing in t), the first effect dominates.
The reason why α increases the probability of no citation and decreases the probability of neutral citations is more subtle. The intuition is that, with negative citations ruled out, neutral citations can convey a less than ambivalent message, essentially by "damning with faint praise". As α increases, the panel in case i gives more thought to the externality this imposes on case j. Consequently, there is a tendency for a type 1 panel to substitute toward no citation and a type 3 panel to substitute toward positive citation. Notes: All columns report Probit coefficient and (linearized robust) SEs corrected for choice based sampling using STATA's suite of survey commands. In column (1), proportions are obtained via STATA's proportion estimator for survey data (svy: prop) and multiplied by 100. Notes: All columns report Probit coefficient and (linearized robust) SEs corrected for choice based sampling using STATA's suite of survey commands. In column (4), proportions are obtained via STATA's proportion estimator for survey data (svy: prop) and multiplied by 100 Notes: All columns report coefficients from a binary sample selection model (Heck Probit) and (linearized robust) SEs corrected for choice based sampling using STATA's suite of survey commands. Column (7) reports estimates from Table 6 for comparison purposes.
